Tuesday, 21 December 1999

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

A covenant to accuse oneself, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalid. For in the condition of nature where every man is judge, there is no place for accusation: and in the civil state the accusation is followed with punishment, which, being force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is also true of the accusation of those by whose condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a father, wife, or benefactor. For the testimony of such an accuser, if it be not willingly given, is presumed to be corrupted by nature, and therefore not to be received: and where a man's testimony is not to be credited, he is not bound to give it. Also accusations upon torture are not to be reputed as testimonies. For torture is to be used but as means of conjecture, and light, in the further examination and search of truth: and what is in that case confessed tendeth to the ease of him that is tortured, not to the informing of the torturers, and therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient testimony: for whether he deliver himself by true or false accusation, he does it by the right of preserving his own life.

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

Covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of mere nature, are obligatory. For example, if I covenant to pay a ransom, or service for my life, to an enemy, I am bound by it. For it is a contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive money, or service for it, and consequently, where no other law (as in the condition of mere nature) forbiddeth the performance, the covenant is valid.

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

If a covenant be made wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but trust one another, in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of war of every man against every man) upon any reasonable suspicion, it is void: but if there be a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not void. For he that performeth first has no assurance the other will perform after, because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power; which in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal, and judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth first does but betray himself to his enemy, contrary to the right he can never abandon of defending his life and means of living.

But in a civil estate, where there a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform first is obliged so to do.

The cause of fear, which maketh such a covenant invalid, must be always something arising after the covenant made, as some new fact or other sign of the will not to perform, else it cannot make the covenant void. For that which could not hinder a man from promising ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

For God Almighty, having promised paradise to those men, hoodwinked with carnal desires, that can walk through this world according to the precepts and limits prescribed by him, they say he that shall so walk shall merit paradise ex congruo. But because no man can demand a right to it by his own righteousness, or any other power in himself, but by the free grace of God only, they say no man can merit paradise ex condigno. This, I say, I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because disputers do not agree upon the signification of their own terms of art longer than it serves their turn, I will not affirm anything of their meaning: only this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth meriteth, and may claim the prize as due.

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

He that performeth first in the case of a contract is said to merit that which he is to receive by the performance of the other, and he hath it as due. Also when a prize is propounded to many, which is to be given to him only that winneth, or money is thrown amongst many to be enjoyed by them that catch it; though this be a free gift, yet so to win, or so to catch, is to merit, and to have it as due. For the right is transferred in the propounding of the prize, and in throwing down the money, though it be not determined to whom, but by the event of the contention.

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise, are an insufficient sign of a free gift and therefore not obligatory. For if they be of the time to come, as, tomorrow I will give, they are a sign I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but remaineth till I transfer it by some other act. But if the words be of the time present, or past, as, I have given, or do give to be delivered tomorrow, then is my tomorrow's right given away today; and that by the virtue of the words, though there were no other argument of my will. And there is a great difference in the signification of these words, volo hoc tuum esse cras, and cras dabo; that is, between I will that this be thine tomorrow, and, I will give it thee tomorrow: for the word I will, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will present; but in the latter, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to come: and therefore the former words, being of the present, transfer a future right; the latter, that be of the future, transfer nothing. But if there be other signs of the will to transfer a right besides words; then, though the gift be free, yet may the right be understood to pass by words of the future: as if a man propound a prize to him that comes first to the end of a race, the gift is free; and though the words be of the future, yet the right passeth: for if he would not have his words so be understood, he should not have let them run.

From "Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

Again, one of the contractors may deliver the thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after, and in the meantime be trusted; and then the contract on his part is called pact, or covenant: or both parts may contract now to perform hereafter, in which cases he that is to perform in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called keeping of promise, or faith, and the failing of performance, if it be voluntary, violation of faith.

When the transferring of right is not mutual, but one of the parties transferreth in hope to gain thereby friendship or service from another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of charity, or magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; this is not contract, but gift, free gift, grace: which words signify one and the same thing.

Signs of contract are either express or by inference. Express are words spoken with understanding of what they signify: and such words are either of the time present or past; as, I give, I grant, I have given, I have granted, I will that this be yours: or of the future; as, I will give, I will grant, which words of the future are called promise.

Signs by inference are sometimes the consequence of words; sometimes the consequence of silence; sometimes the consequence of actions; sometimes the consequence of forbearing an action: and generally a sign by inference, of any contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the contractor.

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

To lay down a man's right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same. For he that renounceth or passeth away his right giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before, because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature, but only standeth out of his way that he may enjoy his own original right without hindrance from him, not without hindrance from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man by another man's defect of right is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right original.

Right is laid aside, either by simply renouncing it, or by transferring it to another. By simply renouncing, when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. By transferring, when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person or persons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned or granted away his right, then is he said to be obliged, or bound, not to hinder those to whom such right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he ought, and it is duty, not to make void that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is injustice, and injury, as being sine jure; the right being before renounced or transferred. So that injury or injustice, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that which in the disputations of scholars is called absurdity. For as it is there called an absurdity to contradict what one maintained in the beginning; so in the world it is called injustice, and injury voluntarily to undo that which from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply renounceth or transferreth his right is a declaration, or signification, by some voluntary and sufficient sign, or signs, that he doth so renounce or transfer, or hath so renounced or transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these signs are either words only, or actions only; or, as it happeneth most often, both words and actions. And the same are the bonds, by which men are bound and obliged: bonds that have their strength, not from their own nature (for nothing is more easily broken than a man's word), but from fear of some evil consequence upon the rupture.

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

But though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another, yet in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men.

To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place.

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man. For war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

Again, men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all.

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed.

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

From this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only) endeavour to destroy or subdue one another.

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

NATURE hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself.

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they please, give Authority to One man, to represent them every one; as well as give such Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever, and consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a Monarch, as absolutely as to other Representative.

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do Agree, and Covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all. (that is to say, to be their Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted for it, as he that Voted against it, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own [...]

From "The Leviathan"

By Thomas Hobbes.

The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be in the aptest means thereunto.

By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft take away part of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.

A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.

Wednesday, 8 December 1999

Debt and Development: Ghana - a case study

By Stuart Simpson, p. 3.

A decrease in funding or demands for cash will immediately wipe out any benefit from savings on debt service payments, just as any increase in funding will provide a great deal more money to spend than is released by debt forgiveness. The real benefits to be gained from debt relief arise from the ability of developing countries to issue new debt.

The recent case of a vulture fund demanding Zambia honour a debt originally issued by Romania may have the effect of wiping out much of the current year’s cash benefit Zambia has received from debt relief. Donegal International bought the debt off Romania for $3.2m and successfully sued for payment by Zambia in the UK courts, finally settling for an amount of $15.5m [...]

This resulted in much moral hand wringing in the media, aid agencies and among governments. Donegal International were criticised for making obscene profits by exploiting one of the world’s poorest countries. None of the moral condemnation changes the fact that the benefit Zambia derived from lower service payments has vanished overnight.

Debt and Development: Ghana - a case study

By Stuart Simpson, p. 2.

Oxfam, among others, has drawn attention to the fact that debt relief figures mislead the public. The criticism levelled, that debt relief is financed from current aid budgets is correct, but doesn’t go nearly far enough. The way debt relief is measured is far more problematic. Current aid figures that include the present value of debts reduced or cancelled imply vastly greater aid flows to the developing world than are actually taking place. The reduction in annual spending to service debts (interest payments) is a much smaller figure than the present value of the total debts forgiven. Developing countries need large amounts of cash now, not small savings in interest payments over the course of a generation. It is dishonest for world leaders to continually quote the present value of debts forgiven, as if all this money is now available to spend on new roads or power stations.

Tuesday, 7 December 1999

From "Globalization, Growth and Distribution: Framing the Questions"

By Ravi Kanbur, p. 20.

[...] suppose that the poverty numbers were not missing anything—that they actually did capture the true snapshot picture of the evolution of wellbeing at the lower tail of the distribution. Then why should rising inequality matter if poverty is falling?

The answer depends of course on what sort of welfare function we have in mind. The standard Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Function, where the wellbeing of each individual in the snapshot counts positively, but at a diminishing rate at the margin, would justify concern with inequality. All else equal, it would be better to have a more equal distribution for a given mean.

From "Globalization, Growth and Distribution: Framing the Questions"

By Ravi Kanbur, p. 17.

The official poverty statistics are snapshots at different points in time. They do not follow the same individuals over time to track their fortunes. If they did, they might find considerable churning into and out of poverty between two points in time.

From "Globalization, Growth and Distribution: Framing the Questions"

By Ravi Kanbur, p. 14.

Some of the strongest critics of official government narratives of poverty decline tend to be women’s groups. One possible explanation for this disconnect is the above fact that household survey based methods do not allow for intrahousehold inequality in consumption, especially between the genders.

From "Globalization, Growth and Distribution: Framing the Questions"

By Ravi Kanbur, p. 12.

Consider then an economy in which there is a reorientation from a heavily publicly provided services past to a more private sector oriented future, which is precisely what, as some may argue, is leading to the higher growth rates. The household survey data will capture transactions in the expanded private sphere, but it will not capture corresponding reduction in public services which, no matter how inefficiently and ineffectively provided, had at least some value to them.

From "Globalization, Growth and Distribution: Framing the Questions"

By Ravi Kanbur, p. 10.

Consider an economy in which the incidence of poverty—the fraction of population below the poverty line—has been falling at 1 percentage point per annum. This is a pretty good rate of decline, especially for an African country. At this rate, depending on the initial level of poverty, an economy would be well on track for achieving the first Millennium Development Goal, on reduction of the incidence of income poverty. But suppose that population growth in this economy is 2 percentage points per annum. In this case, although the fraction of poor population is falling at 1 percentage point per annum, the absolute number of the poor is rising at 1 percentage point per annum. For an NGO working with the poor on the ground, the soup kitchens are fuller than ever, there are more street children than ever, there are more distressed farmers than ever—and yet the official statistics seem to proclaim a reduction in poverty.

From "Globalization, Growth and Distribution: Framing the Questions"

By Ravi Kanbur, p. 6.

[...] In Ghana, the North-South divide looms larger than ever in the political economy, despite a decade or more of growth which has reduced measured poverty significantly.(7) In South Africa, the first post-Apartheid decade was characterized by low growth, and increasing inequality and poverty.(8) In the last five years, despite a pick up in growth rates, inequality has continued to increase and income poverty reduction has languished, leading the government to start a discourse on a "second economy", disconnected from the "first economy" which is reaping the benefits of growth. In Chile, spectacular growth and poverty reduction over the past quarter century have not allayed distributional concerns on growing inequality.(9)

[...]

(7) Aryeetey and Mckay (2007.).
(8) see Bhorat and Kanbur (2006).
(9) Birdsall and Szekely (2003) note: Between 1992 and 1996, Chilean GDP per capita expanded by more than 30 percent in real terms and moderate poverty (headcount ratio declined by 20 percent. But income inequality increased (the Gini index increased by 7 percentage points). Had the income distribution remained as in 1992, the proportion of poor would have actually declined much more, by 50 percent."

From "Globalization, Growth and Distribution: Framing the Questions"

By Ravi Kanbur, p. 5.

[...] Of course if growth is accompanied by an increase in inequality, the effect on poverty is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of the two forces. Finally, notice that even if inequality does not change, the initial level of inequality will affect the impact of growth on poverty—intuitively, the more unequal the distribution to which a given growth rate is applied, the lower will be the impact on poverty reduction [...]

From "Poverty, Relative to the Ability to Eradicate It: An Index of Poverty Reduction Failure"

By Ravi Kanbur & Diganta Mukherjee.

This family of indices for the poverty reduction failure provides a useful template to discuss a number of interesting issues. If the poverty of any poor individual increases, so does PRF. If the income of any non-poor individual increases without a decrease in poverty, so does PRF. For a generally poor society, where those above the poverty line are not particularly well off, the PRF is low and the index registers this. Consider two societies where total population size and the income distribution below the poverty line are identical. Any standard measure of poverty will then be the same in the two societies. But if non-poor incomes in one society are much higher, then the PRF in this society will also be higher. A high PRF is also, in one sense, an indictment of wealthy societies that tolerate poverty.

Of course our measure of poverty reduction failure evokes inequality, since it penalizes increase in non-poor incomes without a corresponding increase in poor incomes. But it is not same as inequality. It is easy to show that a mean preserving spread in the income distribution can move the PRF index in any direction, and an increase in any standard inequality measure can coincide with an increase or a decrease on the PRF index.

Monday, 6 December 1999

From "Role of non-govermental organizations"

In Companion to development studies, p. 495.

In the past, goverments of developing countries were seen as spearheading the developent process. However, such paternalism reached its limits when it became clear that governments did not have the financial resources to pay for the essential services of the poor and lacked the organizational expertise to be effective. In such an environment, the important role for NGOs in the last two decades has been in mitigating the adverse costs of structural adjustment and promoting donor reform packages in offering insurance against a political backlash against harsh adjustment regimes.

From "Strengthening civil society in developing countries"

By Alison Van Rooy.

What do we mean, precisely, when we use the term "civil society"?

[...]

Civil society as values and norms

For some, the "civil" in civil society is the operative word: the term describes the kind of well-behaved society that we want to live in, the goal for our political and social effort. This ideal society is trustful, tolerant, co-operative -- ambitions held to be universal and to be universally good.

Note the current conversation about "social capital," for instance, invigorated by Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work and Bowling Alone (1993, 1995) [...]

Civil society as a collective noun

[...] synonymous with the voluntary sector (or the Third Sector)' and with advocacy groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), social movement agents, human rights organizations and other actors explicitly involved in change work [...] just how many CSOs are there? [...]

Civil society as a space for action

[...] together with state and market, one of the three "spheres" that interface in the making of democratic societies [...]

Civil society as a historical moment

Others describe civil society as a historical moment, either a real or idealized description of society when a set of prerequisites was in place. Adam Seligman's prerequisites were the primacy of the individual, rights-bearing and autonomous, and a shared public space in which agreed rules and norms are sustained [...]

Civil society as anti-hegemony

One of the most radical optics on the debate argues that civil society is not conducive to modern liberalism (in politics or economics) but is instead its antithesis.

First, many CSOs are disengaged from formal political processes and work partly underground, outside conventional institutions of civil society and the state, or are mobilized in opposition to prevailing cultural norms. In positing alternate visions of society (about gender and power, sexual identity, anti-consumerism, anti-globalization or anti-Westernism), movements may not ever join in formal political action. If one defines civil society primarily in terms of its relationship with the state, one may well miss this aspect of civil organizing.

For policy-makers trying to work in other cultures or in sub-cultures within their own, the implication is that their intervention may be utterly unwanted -- a symptom of the perceived cultural and economic dominance of "hegemonic" institutions [...]

Civil society as an antidote to the state

The sixth overlapping optic describes civil society by its activities in opposition to a centralized or autocratic state. Promoting civil society has come to mean limiting the state [...]

Another concern focuses on the implications for sovereignty in a globalizing civil society. Lipschultz argues that we are seeing an increase in international activism because of a leaking away of sovereignty (1992). Environmental degradation, the universalization of human rights (and the notion that foreign actors can act upon the transgression of rights in other countries), civil wars, drug trafficking, and other transborder activities are no longer seen to belong to the governments that govern the territory upon which they take place.

From "Too much, too soon: IMF conditionality and inflation targeting"

By Gerald Epstein.

[...] despite little evidence of the success of inflation targeting in promoting economic growth, employment creation or poverty reduction, the IMF is increasingly using loan conditions and technical assistance to push its use [...] despite what the orthodox approach maintains, employment generation and economic growth, are not automatic by-products of stabilisation-focused central bank policy [...]

Surprisingly, despite a disappointing record, this almost single-minded focus on inflation is gaining a more secure foothold in monetary policy circles and the circles are widening to include an increasing number of developing countries. According to a recent report by the IMF, an increasing number of central banks in emerging markets are planning to adopt inflation targeting as their operating framework. An IMF staff survey of 88 non-industrial countries found that more than half expressed a desire to move to explicit or implicit quantitative inflation targets. Nearly three-quarters of these countries expressed an interest in moving to "fully-fledged" inflation targeting by 2010 [...] the IMF is considering altering its conditionality and monitoring structures to include inflation targets [...]

Saturday, 4 December 1999

From "The emergence of the governance agenda: sovereignty, neo-liberal bias and the politics of international development"

By Rob Jenkins (in the Companion to development studies, p. 485).

Genuine governance reforms that would reduce the North-South disparities that characterize, for instance, participation within international organizations (to say nothing of the accountability deficit within even rule-based institutions of global governance such as the WTO) would represent a substantial challenge to the very goverments that control development agencies. Even technical assistance to encourage poorer countries (and poorer groups within them) to participate more whole-heartedly in these organisations is heavily slanted away from programmes that might assist them in negotiating for such things as enhanced terms of trade, new rules for enforcing international agreements, and compensation for global environmental-protection measures.

From "The emergence of the governance agenda: sovereignty, neo-liberal bias and the politics of international development"

By Rob Jenkins (in the Companion to development studies, p. 488).

By seeking to recreate a badly flawed vision of how "functional" civil societies in the West actually operate -- or, even worse, operatied at an earlier stage in their development trajectories -- both social theorists and development practitioners have betrayed an instinctive reluctance to face up to civil society's inherently precarious condition and sometimes ugly character, or to let democracy do its unpredicable work [...]

[Cf. Gellner, Ernest (1994), Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals, London: Hamish Hamilton.]

From "The emergence of the governance agenda: sovereignty, neo-liberal bias and the politics of international development"

By Rob Jenkins (in the Companion to development studies, p. 485).

[...] the impositions of international financial institutions would have been more successfully resisted had developing countries possessed a more credible claim to having in practice exercised the governance aspect of sovereignty, defined in terms of minimal levels of societal penetration, not on the basis of how "good" any such governance must have been [...]

From "The emergence of the governance agenda: sovereignty, neo-liberal bias and the politics of international development"

By Rob Jenkins (in the Companion to development studies, p. 486).

In assessing the sovereignty implications at this level of external intervention, it is worth taking note of Hirst's observation that sovereignty consists both of states' ability to make decisions independently of external authorities and their capacity actually to govern -- that is, to effect at least a respectiable percentage of intended outcomes. This latter dimension of sovereignty had long been lacking in many countries that attained "independence" in the great wave of decolonization from 1945-1975.

From "The emergence of the governance agenda: sovereignty, neo-liberal bias and the politics of international development"

From Rob Jenkins (in the Companion to development studies, p. 485).

The notion of good governance should, in principle, refer to any mode of public decision-making that helps to advance human welfare, however conceived. But because of the heavy influence of aid donors, governance has come to be associated with institutions designed to support market-led development.

[...] Development consultants deployed to overhaul failing Third World states have seized upon two suitably plastic ideas in particular: participation and accountability. Improving both, while not undermining managerial efficiency, has been the focus of intensive development intervention [...]

From "The Strange Case of The Washington Consensus"

By Ravi Kanbur.

[...] in the 1980s, and to a certain extent well into the 1990s, many saw the main task as being storming the citadel of statist development strategies. In this mindset, nuances were beside the point—intellectual curiosities which paled in comparison to the benefits of rapid and deep movements away from the former paradigm. And, moreover, Washington institutions were deeply suspicious of the real intentions of those they were dealing with. They suspected, perhaps rightly, that those on the other side were hell bent on preserving the status quo. In this setting, a negotiating stance, rather than a dialogue based on mutual comprehension, was appropriate. So the negotiators from Washington always took a more purist stance, a more extreme stance than even their own intellectual framework permitted [...]

From ""What Should the Bank Think about the Washington Consensus?"

By John Williamson.

[...] My original paper (Williamson 1990, Ch 2) argued that the set of policy reforms which most of official Washington thought would be good for Latin American countries could be summarized in ten propositions:

*Fiscal discipline.
*A redirection of public expenditure priorities towards fields with high economic
returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care,
primary education, and infrastructure.
*Tax reform (to lower marginal tax rates and broaden the tax base).
*Interest rate liberalization.
*A competitive exchange rate.
*Trade liberalization.
*Liberalization of FDI inflows.
*Privatization.
*Deregulation (in the sense of abolishing barriers to entry and exit).
*Secure property rights.

From "Aid, Conditionality, and Debt in Africa"

By Ravi Kanbur.

Aid institutions are judged purely by their financial flow. Because the institution is judged by how much money it has transferred, there is tremendous pressure on the staff to sign the checks [...] Usually the money is front-loaded while the actions are backloaded. Most of the time the actions are not fulfilled. The solution is to turn this around. Ask for up-front actions and then backload the disbursements. Paul Collier has argued the fact that money is tied to this in the future questions the policy. Policy reversal has been a major trend in the African environment. Instead of having five conditions jointly for the entire amount, why not break it up into floating trenches into 20-20-20-20-20 each. So that each condition means less in terms of financial things.

From the Jubilee Debt Campaign web site

[...] The poorest 54 countries have debts totalling between US$ 300 and US$ 400 billion, whilst for the poorest 152 countries, it is over US$ 2.5 trillion. [...] These are the latest figures available - there has been some debt cancellation in 2006, but there will also have been new debts taken on. The overall figures are unlikely to have changed hugely.

From "Aid, Conditionality, and Debt in Africa"

By Ravi Kanbur, p. 3.

[...] Four main pressures were present [affecting the release of structural adjustment loans to Ghana, following its failure to meet conditions]: governmental, the private sector (in Ghana and abroad), bilateral donors, and the project officers of the World Bank itself. Everything depends on the relationship between the World Bank and the country, on the macro-level being right and not being off-track. They wanted to get the thing back on track because without that the highway sector project, etc, the project sector officers wouldn’t move unless this was sorted out.

From "Aid, Conditionality, and Debt in Africa"

By Ravi Kanbur.

Suppose there's a social sector loan with social sector conditionality, meaning the government will spend this much more on primary sector education. Suppose the government does not fulfill that; it has not met the conditions. The banks’ money is conditioned upon the government going through with the conditions. If money is then denied them because the goverment has not met that condition, the poor will be hit with a double whammy.

From "Aid, Conditionality, and Debt in Africa"

By Ravi Kanbur, p. 3.

A study done by the Operations Evaluation Dept. of the World Bank looked at compliance rates on structural adjustments loan conditions. With the loans come conditions, it is a contract between the World Bank and the government, and the countries are meant to fulfill the conditions and then the money is released. Compliance rates on the conditions run from 30% to 40%. Release rates on the money run to 99.9%. What is going on? It is a contract, there are conditions in that contract, the core of it is this conditionality, but the compliance rate on these conditions is 30%-40% and the release rate is 99.9%.

From "Aid, Conditionality, and Debt in Africa"

By Ravi Kanbur.

[...] aid allocation, aid flows, do not induce the adoption of good policies. So if it happens that a country has a good policy environment, and aid happens to flow to that country, then it will interact and have a good effect. But aid by itself cannot induce the adoption of good policies. Aid has been flowing to those countries where the policies are bad, not good [...]

From "Aid, Conditionality, and Debt in Africa"

By Ravi Kanbur.

[...] aid has not been flowing predominantly to those places where it could have a positive effect [...]

From "Aid, Conditionality, and Debt in Africa"

By Ravi Kanbur.

[...] aid is indeed effective in improving growth rates, in improving social indicators, when the policy environment is right in the country. They interact, the two variables, policy environment and aid flows, and they find with the interactive variables, a positive effect [...]

Friday, 3 December 1999

From "The Man Without a Plan"

By Amartya Sen.

To arrive at his negative view of economic aid, Easterly draws on large-scale cross-sectional statistical analysis, as well as on case studies of particular plans and programs. Such intercountry comparisons have become fashionable as a way of isolating solid connections between causes and effects, but they are seriously compromised by the difficulty of comparing diverse experiences: countries can differ significantly in variables other than those that are brought under cross-sectional scrutiny [...]

From "The Man Without a Plan"

By Amartya Sen.

Market ideologues may love the battering that large-scale state intervention receives through Easterly's hard-hitting prose. But they will be less happy with his carefully spelled-out skepticism of schemes for the immediate replacement of all economic institutions with a pure market system [...]

From "The White Man's Burden"

By William Easterly, p. 5.

Let's call the advocates of the traditional approach the Planners, while we call the agents for change in the alternative approach the Searchers. The short answer on why dying poor children don't get twelve-cent medicines, while healthy rich children do get Harry Potter, is that twelve-cent medicines are supplied by Planners while Harry Potter is supplied by Searchers [...]

[cosmetic caveats]

[...] A Planner thinks he already knows the answers; he thinks of poverty as a technical engineering problem that his answers will solve. A Searcher admits he doesn't know the answers in advance; he believes that poverty is a complicated tangle of political, social, historical, institutional, and technological factors. A Searcher hopes to find answers to individual problems only by trial and error experimentation. A Planner believes outsiders know enough to impose solutions. A Searcher believes only insiders have enough knowledge to find solutions, and that most solutions must be homegrown.

Thursday, 2 December 1999

From "Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical Thought, Development and Social"

By Arturo Escobar (Social Text, No. 31/32, Third World and Post-Colonial Issues (1992) p. 48-49)

The recent struggles in the Third World go well beyond the principles of equality, relations of production and democracy; moreover, they constitute arenas for redefining and recovering these terms. Even the possibility of building a "counter-hegemonic formation" through articulation, as Laclau and Mouffe suggest, seems to be contrary to the movements' practices and would evince a type of rationality that popular movements may not share. This does not mean that alliances may not take place. They certainly do and must. In fact, networks of popular movements are appearing in several countries and internationally (in the case of indigenous peoples and women). But social movements are not ruled by the logic of all or nothing; they must consider the contradictory and multiple voices present in such experiences without reducing them to an unitary logic [...]

In the long run, it is a matter of generating new ways of seeing, of renewing social and cultural self-descriptions by displacing the categories with which Third World groups have been constructed by dominant forces, and by producing views of reality which make visible the numerous loci of power of those forces; a matter of "regenerating people's spaces" or creating new ones, with those who have actually survived the age of modernity and development by resisting it or by insinuating themselves creatively in the circuits of capital and modernization.

From "Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical Thought, Development and Social"

By Arturo Escobar (Social Text, No. 31/32, Third World and Post-Colonial Issues (1992) pp. 47-8)

To conclude, we may postulate the existence of three major discourses in Latin America with the potential to articulate - and are actually articulating in many cases - forms of struggle:

1. The discourse of the fulfillment of the democratic imaginary (including "needs," economic and social justice, human rights, class, gender and ethnic equality, etc.). This first possibility originates in the egalitarian discourses of the West, although it does not necessarily have to follow the West's experience. This first discourse offers the possibility for material and institutional gains and the radicalization of democracy towards more pluralist societies.

2. The discourse of difference, including cultural difference, alterity, autonomy and the right of each society to self-determination. This second possibility originates in a variety of sources: anti-imperialist struggles, those of ethnic groups and women, the challenge to European ethnocentrism and conventional epistemologies, revisions of history, etc. The potential here is for the strategic release and furthering of some of these struggles.

3. Anti-development discourses proper, which originate in the current crisis of development and the work of grassroots groups. The potential here is for more radical transformations of the modern capitalist order and the search for alternative ways of organizing societies and economies, of satisfying needs, of healing and living.

From "Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical Thought, Development and Social"

By Arturo Escobar (Social Text, No. 31/32, Third World and Post-Colonial Issues (1992) p. 48)

The discourse of the fulfillment of the democratic imaginary (including "needs," economic and social justice, human rights, class, gender and ethnic equality, etc.) [...] originates in the egalitarian discourses of the West, although it does not necessarily have to follow the West's experience.

From "Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical Thought, Development and Social"

By Arturo Escobar (Social Text, No. 31/32, Third World and Post-Colonial Issues (1992) p. 48)

A critical view of modernity [...] emphasizes the need to resist post-Enlightment universals (such as those of economy, development, politics and liberation); a reflection on historicity allows us to foreground the cultural aspects of the new movements; the discussion of meaning and background cultural practices provides a way to study the connection between cultural norms, definitions of social life and movement organization; this discussion also provides a conceptual tool for exploring the more profound effects of social movements, namely, those that operate at the level of life's basic norms.

From "Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical Thought, Development and Social"

By Arturo Escobar (Social Text, No. 31/32, Third World and Post-Colonial Issues (1992) p. 47)

It is clear that in the Third World the process of needs interpretation and satisfaction is inextricably linked to the development apparatus. The "basic human needs" strategy, pushed by the World Bank and adopted by most international agencies, has played a crucial role in this regard (see, for instance, World Bank 1975; Leipziger and Streeten 1981). This strategy, however, is based on a liberal human rights discourse and on the rational, scientific assessment and measurement of "needs"; lacking a significant link to people's everyday experience, "basic human needs" discourse does not foster greater political participation. This is why the struggle over needs interpretation is a key political arena of struggle for new social actors involved in redirecting the apparatuses of development and the state." The challenge for social movements - and the "experts" who work with them - is to come up with new ways of talking about needs and of demanding their satisfaction in ways that bypass the rationality of development with its "basic needs" discourse.

From "Alternative progress indicators to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a means towards sustainable development"

p. 17 (Policy Department, Economic and Scientific Policy).

In fact, there is an undeniably strong correlation between GDP levels and components of basic welfare such as high literacy rates, better nutrition and health care, communications technology, life expectancy, all important factors contributing to people's welfare. However, there is also some evidence that the above mentioned positive correlation between welfare and GDP is conditional in that it does not seem to hold for all "levels" of GDP. Helliwell (2003) estimates a de-linking of GDP and (subjective) social welfare at a per capita GDP of approx. 15.000 USD.

From "From "Alternative progress indicators to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a means towards sustainable development"


From "Alternative progress indicators to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a means towards sustainable development"

p. 14 (Policy Department, Economic and Scientific Policy).

Even if accepting a certain type of measure for individual welfare, the aggregation to a societal welfare function may be too ambitious.

From "Aid conditionality"

By Tony Killick (In The companion to development studies, p. 483).

Above all, governments often see that they have little to fear if they do not keep their side of the policy-for-money bargain.

From "The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith"

By Gilbert Rist, p. 21.

What if 'development' is part of our modern religion?

From "Aid conditionality"

By Tony Killick (in Companion to development studies, p. 482).

It appears that the programmes are instumental in sterngthening export and balance of payents performance but have little impact on inflation; they do not typically make much difference to the pace of economic growth; but they are consistently associated with reduced investment levels, which threatens economic progress in the longer term [...]

Among the possible explanations of weak results, poor programme implementation is a large problem, manifested by programmes which break down or take far longer than originally planned, and a lot of pretending that conditions [...] have been met when the reality is otherwise [...] The revealed leverage of programmes over various policy instruments is quite weak. It appears that they can make a decisive difference to policy instruments (like the exchange rate) which can readily be monitored, are directly controlled by the goverment, involve a few individuals and agencies, and are not easy to organize against. But the results are more problematical when it comes to complex structural, distributional or institutional measures.

This limited effectiveness of conditionality is regrettable because the evidenc further shows that, when exectued, the IFIs' approach to policy does result in improved economic performance [...]

[Cf. also Killick et. al. 1998, esp. Ch 7].

From "Aid conditionality"

By Tony Killick (Development studies reader, p. 479).

Conditionality can be viewed as a substitute for the collateral assets which private lenders would require [...] as a safeguard against moral hazard, i.e. against the danger that the provision of aid will actually weaken a government's will to undertake policy reforms [...] A related justification concerns the influence of recipient-country policies on aid effectiveness. Bilateral donors and IFIs are dispensing public monies paid by the taxpayers of the richer countries [...] Donors additionally argue that their support can be used as a political resource by reformers within a government and may tip the balance in favour of improvement by giving reformers additional clout when policy decisions are taken [...] Conditionality can further improve domestic economic policies by inducing greater consistency over time [...] This is important where a goverment's policies lack credibility among potential investors and others whose decision will impact on the economic results obtained [...]

From "Third World debt"

By Stuart Corbride (in Companion to development studies p. 480).

Africa's debts might not matter much in the overall scheme of things (except to the countries concerned), but with the ending of the old War there is little evidence to suggest that Africa "itself" matters much today. Inaction is then a corollary of "unimportance."

From "Third World debt"

By Stuart Corbridge, in Companion to development studies, p. 478.

Faced with a 'scissors' crisis of declining exports to the US and Europe, and higher debt payments in a strengthening dollar, most of these countries [borrowing countries, esp. Latin American] sought to reschedule their debts (pay them back over a longer period, sometimes at higher rates of interest, and always for a fee) in the context of 'London Club' negotiations which brought debtors and creditors together with institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF typically used these meetings to persuade the defaulting country to 'put its house in order' by agreeing to a structural adjestment programme. A standard programme involved currency devaluation, tax and public spending cuts, and incentives to support export-led growth.

From "United Nations Development Programme"

[In Africa as a whole] where only child in two goes to school, goverments transfer four times more to northern creditors in debt payments than they spend on health and education [...]

From "Aid or Development?"

By Willem Gustaaf Zeylstra, pp. 48-53.

[...] the decolonization in Africa South of the Sahara cannot directly be compared with that in Asia, and as far as France is concerned, with North Africa. Merely creating new states in the framework of decolonization has been shown not to explain the relationship between decolonization and development aid. This relationship, however, becomes obvious only where, as in Africa South of the Sahara, assistance to colonies was integrated in a systematically planned decolonization [...] This kind of decolonization cannot be imagined as resulting only from a loss of political power and prestige. On the contrary, it must have had its roots in a colonial policy including concern with the welface of the subject peaple. Historically seen it must have been a logical consequence of an idea embedded in the rationale of colonialism.

[...]

The early British liberalism was a synthesis of the common sense of Adam Smith and Bentham, and of the humanitarian ideals o rousseau and the French Revolution. This ambivalent social philosophy produced a nationalism founded on social idealism, as well as an abstract materialistic capitalism unconcerned with national boundaries. Because it was meant to counterbalance this capitalism, the European labour movement could only succeed once it felt itself carried by international ideals. The nineteenth century colonialism, fruit of capitalism linked to nationalism, demanded capital as well as people. As it was a European social concept, it underwent the influence of social developments within Europe. "Out of the adjustment of the relation between capital and labour on an international plane has arisen a common recognition that the economic development of the tropics is a matter of world welfare."

[...] in the Victorian era in which British power and wealth reached their zenith, the increased British self-confidence looked ound for a more suitable philosophic justification. The new philosophy again joined rational ideas with idealistic objectives. "From Darwin's principle of the survival of the fittest it derived a justification of various schools, the doctrine of social justice. These ideas, applied to colonial policy in the new environment, gave birth to modern imperialism." [...]

The paternalistic idealism born of Western social philosophy that inspired the colonial administrations during the first half of the twentieth century, originally did not respond to wishes of the subject people to share the blessings of Western civilization. It is not surprising, therefore, that to the apostles of the new era the possibility, sooner or later, of the subject-territories becoming politically independent was unthinkable.

[...]

The introduction for the first time of concepts such as "development" and "welfare" in statements of colonial policy did not mean that the metropolitan countries were prepared to render financial sacrifices for these purposes. It was supposed that the colonial territories would be able to finance their own development once their economic output started increasing by the application of Western techniques and efficiency.

[...] Although the mother country, while introducing modern techniques and ideas in the colonial society, was not supposed to incur expenses, it had to furnish "appropriate instruments of welfare" required by a "constructive" colonial policy [...] For this reason thousands of British, French, Dutch and Belgian civil servants and experts were sent overseas, to become an army of pioneers in dealing with the problems resulting from letting Western civilization penetrate areas with a divergent cultural heritage. Much of the knowledge and insight gathered by these people has retained its value for modern developeent research. There is no reason why a certain reluctance to draw upon their experience should not be overcome, provided Balandier's warning is heeded: "Quelle que soit la doctrine politique adopteé, les rapports de domination et de soumission existant entre société coloniale et société colonisée caractérisent la situation coloniale."

[...]

Because the resistance to the colonial guardianship in Asia and North Africa had sprung from the peoples' devotion to their own cultural identity, it had roused feelings of disappointment and frustration with the colonial powers whose cultural pride had been hurt. As a reaction their desire was strengthened to give assistance in territories where Western superiority was not challenged. But precisely by increasing their efforts to further education and economic development, they hastened the moment in which they were bound to admit to themselves that ultimately responsibility for the welfare of the foreign peoples was nowhere compatible with political rule over them [...]

Once a rational conclusion has been reached, it is typically Western logic to translate it into action. Since colonial relationships between peoples were considered obsolete, they should be ended as soon as possible. In the still dependent African and West Indian territories development aid became synonymous with preparation for decolonisation.

From "Aid or Development?"

By Willem Gustaaf Zeylstra, p. 48.

[...] when decolonization began to be implemented [...] it was anticipated that the African states to be formed would remain committed to British assistance, including that of a financial nature. The new approach was formally announced in 1958 during the Commonwealth Trade and Ecoromic Conference in Montreal [...] The solution chosen was to make funds available existing Export Credits Guarantee Department legislation. It was a compromise, proving that the old prejudice against assisting independent countries has not yet been fully overcome. The so-called Commonwealth Assistance Loans (CALs) implied "hard" conditions, that is to say the money was tied to British procurement and interest was chaged at commercial rates [...] Although further decolonization in Africa had provided the reason for taking this step, it is significant that the first CALs were earmarked for India.

From "Aid or Development?"

By Willem Gustaaf Zeylstra, p. 135.

It is true that in practically every developing country one finds a greater or smaller group of people who have been educated, and sometimes have attained high intellectual qualifications, to Western standards, and who are intent on modelling their thoughts and behaviour after the Western example. It is another matter whether these people are indeed truly spokesmen for their own nation when conveying its needs and desires in terms that are familiar to Westerners. In their zeal to plead their country's cause, they may well -- without being insincere -- attempt to translate the untranslatable. All too often, moreover, alienation from the world of thought and feeling of their copatriots has been the price they have had to pay for allowing themselves to be westernized. In many cases, what Mikesell calls "the urge for development", refers to needs and aspirations that are sui generis.

From "The Economics of Foreign Aid"

By Raymond F. Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid (London 1968), p. 21.

Like nationalism, with which it is closely associated, the urge for development is an import from the Western world and is being disseminated mainly by individuals in underdeveloped countries that have had contact with the ideas of the West.

From "Foreign aid in a changing world"

By Peter Burnell (in The development studies companion, p. 475).

Aid's agenda in the 1990s has included encouraging and assisting progress towards liberal democracy, "good governance" and respect for human rights, in developing and post-communist states. The end of the Cold War and Soviet collapse made it possible for DAC donors to attach explicit political conditionalities to their aid, additional to economic, environmental and other conditionalities. Relatively modest sums of under US$5 billion annually are being spent on "political development", especially by the US government's Agency for International Development and the publicly funded, non-governmental National Endowment for Democracy, and Germany's party foundation (Stiftungen). International bodies include the united Nations Electoral Assistance process, especially for "reconciliation elections" in post-conflict situations, improving governance institutions, and even helping new political parties.

Wednesday, 1 December 1999

From "Debating foreign aid: right versus left"

By Jean-Philippe Thérien (Third World Quarterly, Vol 23, No 3, 2002, p. 460).

The Right acknowledges that development assistance is a foreign policy tool that can be useful as either a carrot or a stick [...] But it holds that the fight against poverty ultimately is a duty incumbent upon each state, not on the international community. Seen from this viewpoint, aid is often considered inefficient. In particular, the Right points to the fact that aid has no clear effect on growth or on the policies of developing countries. [...] The explanation given is that, like any state intervention in the economy, aid distorts markets and creates a climate of dependency that inhibits entrepreneurship. Furthermore, development assistance is said to be a source of waste inasmuch as it allows countries to obtain modem equipment they often do not need. Finally, the Right frequently links the failure of aid to poor management by non-democratic governments hostile to Western value [...] In recent years the Right has endeavoured to prove the inefficiency of development assistance by contending that it had not been used in the proper conditions. According to Fieldhouse, 'aid could do little if the recipient countries rejected the price mechanism and the case for free trade and export-led growth, and continued to believe that government controls on virtually all economic and social matters were essential to relieve poverty' [...] In support of this position, a major World Bank report concludes that developing countries with 'mediocre' policies receive more financial aid than those with 'good' policies. [...] For the Right, this situation is plainly unacceptable. It seems urgent that the allocation of aid be more selective and directed more towards those countries where political and institutional reform is well under way.

From "Debating foreign aid: right versus left"

By Jean-Philippe Thérien (Third World Quarterly, Vol 23, No 3, 2002, p. 460).

In the 1960s, for instance, the Left put forward a concept of development that focused on industrialisation almost as heavily as the one advocated by the Right. More recently, the Left has moved unmistakably closer to the Right in its appraisal of the role of the state in the economy. Other issues as well, such as the link between aid and the maintenance of corrupt regimes, have given rise to comparable analyses from the Left and Right.

From "Debating foreign aid: right versus left"

By Jean-Philippe Thérien (Third World Quarterly, Vol 23, No 3, 2002, p. 457-8).

In 1996 this more social view was laid down by the OECD in an ambitious policy statement entitled Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation. [...] Based on the conclusions of the many UN conferences held during the 1990s, this document pinpointed three priority areas for intervention-poverty reduction, social development and the environment-and set specific objectives to be achieved by 2015. The most important of those objectives are to reduce by half the proportion of people living in poverty, to ensure primary education for all, and to reduce by two-thirds the infant mortality rate in developing countries. The OECD policy statement furthermore introduced qualitative goals such as 'capacity development for effective democratic and accountable governance, the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law'. Thus, one of the features of contemporary development aid is to increasingly emphasise 'software' rather than 'hardware.'

From "Debating foreign aid: right versus left"

By Jean-Philippe Thérien (Third World Quarterly, Vol 23, No 3, 2002, p. 457).

It might be said that the 1990s witnessed the fusion of the priorities of the two previous decades. The macro-economic emphasis of the 1980s has been preserved along with the reintroduction of the human-orientated goals of the 1970s. Thus, while it continues to emphasise the need for market-based policy reforms, the new aid agenda is more attuned to the political and social setting in which such reforms are to be carried through.

From "Debating foreign aid: right versus left"

By Jean-Philippe Thérien (Third World Quarterly, Vol 23, No 3, 2002, p. 452).

It should be recalled that the 1980s began with the most severe recession of the postwar period, and the rise of protectionist and monetarist policies throughout the developed world. One effect of these policies was to exacerbate the debt load of the Third World, which swelled from US$639 to US$1341 billion between 1980 and 1990." In this climate of crisis, structural adjustment programmes monitored by the IMF and the World Bank became the only possible development model, as well as the prerequisite for obtaining foreign aid [...] Structural adjustment was founded on two complementary principles: 'scaling down the role of the state and strengthening that of the market in the economy' [...] In practical terms, policy reforms involved reducing public spending, liberalising trade, devaluing currencies, restricting credit and promoting free enterprise.

Throughout the decade, the international financial institutions (IFIs) justified their rigid application of structural adjustment policies with two main arguments. First, for the IFIs, the difficult financial situation of the developing countries was the result of their poor economic management rather than of causes related to their external environment. Second, the IFIs viewed the structural adjustment solution as a matter of common sense: development of any kind was impossible without getting the macro-economic fundamentals right. In an environment dominated by the needs of the market, the very concept of aid was subject to modification.

From "Debating foreign aid: right versus left"

By Jean-Philippe Thérien (Third World Quarterly, Vol 23, No 3, 2002, p. 455).

The 1970s were also a time when the past results of assistance were methodically re-evaluated. A consensus was reached around the idea that Third World development posed a challenge incomparably greater than the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War. In addition, it was recognised that the trickle-down process predicted by the theory of modernisation had not materialised, and that only an elite had profited from the initial phase of foreign aid. This critical reappraisal paved the way for a new approach towards aid: the basic needs strategy. The work of Hollis Chenery and Paul Streeten, both associated with the World Bank, contributed mightily to this intellectual revolution. The former emphasised the need to reconcile the objectives of growth and social [...] The latter drew attention to the notion that development assistance should concentrate 'on the nature of what is provided rather than on income' [...]

Aid as an extension of welfare state values references

Cf. Cranford Pratt, 'Humane internationalism: its significance and its variants', in Pratt (ed.), Internationalism Under Strain: The North-South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989, pp 13-22; Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics; Alain Noel & Jean-Philippe Thérien, 'From domestic to international justice: the welfare state and foreign aid', International Organization, 49(3), 1995, pp. 523-553; and Thérien, & Noel, 'Political parties and foreign aid'.

From "Debating foreign aid: right versus left"

By Jean-Philippe Thérien (Third World Quarterly, Vol 23, No 3, 2002, p. 452).

The flow of the events discussed can be summarised roughly as follows. Foreign aid came into being in the 1940s under the impetus of a left-wing political culture. However, it was in a predominantly right-wing environment, during the 1950-70 period, that development assistance became a major international institution. In the 1970s, the introduction of the concept of basic needs turned the aid regime leftward. Later, during the 1980s, the promotion of structural adjustment coincided with the strong resurgence of the Right. Finally, since the early 1990s, the new emphasis on poverty reduction has signalled the inchoate yet genuine revitalisation of left-wing values.

From "Debating foreign aid: right versus left"

By Jean-Philippe Thérien (Third World Quarterly, Vol 23, No 3, 2002, p. 450).

[...] the main difference between Right and Left is that the Left is more egalitarian than the Right [...] a range of policies intended to promote greater international equality [...] Because of their high level of generality, these assumptions certainly cannot explain foreign aid in all its particulars. Their great advantage, however, is the ability to illuminate the forest rather than the trees. More specifically, the proposed assumptions make it possible to discern a simple yet constant dynamic: the Left is more favourable than the Right to development assistance.

From "Debating foreign aid: right versus left"

By Jean-Philippe Thérien (Third World Quarterly, Vol 23, No 3, 2002, p. 449).

[...] it is revealing that, notwithstanding the lack of a universally accepted definition, a vast majority of observers would agree that the British New Labour Party, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the government of Sweden, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) stand to the left of, say, the Conservative Party, business groups, the government of the USA, and the IMF [...]

From "Debating foreign aid: right versus left"

By Jean-Philippe Therién (Third World Quarterly, Vol 23, No 3, 2002, p. 449).

[...] the transformations of the aid regime cannot be understood outside the ideological and discursive environment in which they were engendered [...]

From "Developing Theories of Foreign Policy Making: A Case Study of Foreign Aid"

By Gilbert R. Winham (The Journal of Politics, Vol. 32, No. 1. (Feb., 1970), pp. 69-70).

The disastrous economic conditions existing in Europe in 1947 represented the destruction of a world system that had prevailed throughout the lives of the men who made the Marshall Plan. It was a system in which the predominant norms were those of democratic institutions infused with Western culture and values. This system, which had its roots in Western Europe, had been severely shaken in the First World War, but it had survived. It had again survived the Second World War, but the damage it sustained had placed its continuing existence in jeopardy.

Thus the concern for economic disaster in Europe, and the equating of that disaster with United States interests, came easily for the American leaders. They simply realized that a war in which they had engaged to preserve a world against Nazism had brought about conditions that could destroy the very thing for which they had fought. This realization did not come immecliately; indeed, it took two years for the war damage and bad weather conditions to bring the Europeans to the point of collapse.

[...]

If the United States gives aid for purposes of inhibiting social or political change, such aid will be out of step with the more important needs of the developing world.

From "Developing Theories of Foreign Policy Making: A Case Study of Foreign Aid"

By Gilbert R. Winham (The Journal of Politics, Vol. 32, No. 1. (Feb., 1970), p. 52).

The most important point about the change in the decision makers' images is not when it occurred, but that it occurred at all. Because of their great concern with the European situation, the U. S. leaders were favorably disposed to contemplate acting on it, but this alone was no guarantee of action. What they perceived in addition to the economic plight of Europe, and in addition to their concern for the national interest of the Vnited States, was why they seriously considered action.

According to the data, the U. S. decision makers began simultaneously to consider the consequences of their actions and to perceive things about the situation that encouraged them to take action. For example, U. S. leaders were able to estimate in tangible terms the amount of assistance needed to redress the crisis in Europe (ESTIM theme). [...] This theme, which recorded all statements either estimating the aid needed by Europe or fixing a termination
date for the aid program, appeared with a high absolute frequency in the communications material and rose relatively during the third quarter [...] That the American decision makers could assess what aid would be needed to accomplish their purposes in Europe, or that they could dcfine what these purposes were, encouraged them to embark on the program. In short, the European Recovery Program was perceived as a "doable" project with a definite termination point.

From "Developing Theories of Foreign Policy Making: A Case Study of Foreign Aid"

By Gilbert R. Winham (The Journal of Politics, Vol. 32, No. 1. (Feb., 1970), p. 53).

Statements like Will Clayton's that "Western Europe is made of our kind of people," were not a major argument for providing foreign assistance. This finding thus casts doubt on the hypothesis that Marshall aid was given because U.S. leaders felt especially "close" to the European nations. It is significant because it undercuts the argument that America's failure to provide Marshall-scale aid to underdeveloped areas outside Western Europe is due to America's lack of empathy with non-European political systems.

A second aspect is the perception that the European situation and/or U.S. assistance concerned the national interest of the United States (NATINT). The data show this theme to be relatively frequent -- it was mentioned 167 times or an average of 2.1 times per speech. These data, which suggest that the policy makers saw U.S., interests tied to European recovery, mere recoded to obtain a more precise idea of how U. S. interests were involved. The NATINT theme was divided into four sub-categories according to whether the perceptions dealt with economic matters such as improved trade relations (NATINT-E), political concerns such as the maintenance of democratic institutions (NATINT-P), security concerns such as preservation of military strength (NATINT-S), or other (NATINT-0).

[...] The results show that there was no single reason why decision makers believed the Marshall Plan to be in the interest of the United States, and that most of the time they were unable to give any substantive content to their allegations about national interest.

From "Developing Theories of Foreign Policy Making: A Case Study of Foreign Aid"

By Gilbert R. Winham (The Journal of Politics, Vol. 32, No. 1. (Feb., 1970), p. 52).

The data show that American leaders were concerned with the plight of Europe's peoples, but that they were decidedly more concerned with the destruction of the European economic system.

Aid in the interests of national security references

Cf. George Liska, "The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid" in American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 63; and Edward S. Mason, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 196-1), 27-28.

Aid in the national interest references

Cf. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (4th ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1967). See also Robert A. Packenham, "Foreign Aid and the National Interest," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 10 (May 1966), 214-221.

From "A Marshall Plan for the Third World"

By Sir Bernard Braine (Third World Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2. (Apr., 1979), p. 48).

Equally, both rich and poor share a mutuality of interest in planning globally with regard to the use of scarce energy resources. Oil wealth will not last forever and while it does there is surely a case for ensuring that the rich nations who consume the bulk of what is available use it sparingly. We do not do so, of course, and future generations may well condemn us for our greed, our wastefulness and our inefficiency. There is a compelling need for rich and poor alike to develop alternative systems based not on oil, or the nuclear option (with all its attendant risks), but on renewable resources of energy such as solar power and biofuels. Indeed, the poor are well placed for this since most of them are located in the world's 'sun belt'. Then, instead of consuming our energy capital as we have been doing recklessly, polluting the atmosphere at the same time, we shall draw on our energy income which is inexhaustible and non-polluting. In this way we shall be helping one another to survive long after fossil fuels have been exhausted.

From "A Marshall Plan for the Third World"

By Sir Bernard Braine (Third World Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2. (Apr., 1979), p. 48).

Take first the question of access to markets. There is evidence that tariff cuts by richer countries permitting an increase in imports of lower cost manufactures from developing countries would lower prices and have more than a marginal anti-inflationary effect. Would this not save some jobs which might otherwise be threatened? Better market access for the developing countries would enhance their capacity to buy more from the developed, especially capital goods that they so greatly need. Would this not stimulate production and employment in the developed countries? Then again, the stabilisation of commodity prices by international agreement would help substantially to keep inflation under control. It would do so by preventing violent price fluctuations and the uncertainties which these cause and which in turn hamper investment in new sources of supply of primary commodities, especially minerals, and so prevent that steady increase in production which an expanding world economy requires.

From "Foreign aid in a changing world"

By Peter Burnell (in V. Desai & R. B. Potter (ed.), Companion to Development Studies, London: Arnold, 2002, p. 474).

[...] the pattern [established in the Marshall Plan] whereby US aid was strongly motivated by political reasons of national security and superpower rivalry has been an enduring feature. Other donors who became prominent later have also pursued multiple goals, although with individual characteristics. These range from economic objectives (Germany and Japan, for example), and a mission civilisatrice (France) to maintaining close historical relationships (around two-thirds of Britain's aid has traditionally gone to Commonwealth countries). The Netherlands, Canada and the Scandinavians are sometimes called "like-minded" donors: they are presumed to share an attachment to goals of "humane internationalism."

From "Foreign aid in a changing world"

By Peter Burnell (in V. Desai & R. B. Potter (ed.), Companion to Development Studies, London: Arnold, 2002, p. 474).

The United States' Marshall Plan (1948-51) aid to economic reconstruction in western Europe set a succesful precedent of promoting development, which aid to other countries since has never really matched.

From "The Development of Underdevelopment"

By André Gunder Frank.

A mounting body of evidence suggests, and I am confident that future historical research will confirm, that the expansion of the capitalist system over the past centuries effectively and entirely penetrated even the apparently most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world. Therefore, the economic, political, social and cultural institutions and relations we now observe there are the products of the historical development of the capitalist system no less than are the seemingly more modern or capitalist features of the national metropoles of these underdeveloped countries.

From "The Economic Factor in International Relations"

By Spyros Economides & Peter Wilson, p. 131.

[...] institutions such as the EU promote aid conditionality for other reasons as well. The EU likes to portray itself as a "civilian power" that uses foreign policy tools other than coercion or force in order to achieve progressive change. This is especially the case with regard to transition economies in the post-comunist world and states aspiring to EU membership.

From "The Economic Factor in International Relations"

By Economides & Wilson, p. 135.

Structural adjustment programmes attach specific conditions to aid, which go far beyond attempting to induce change in one particular sphere of the recipient's domestic or external behaviour. Adjustments have to be made in a range of policy areas that have increasingly come to reflect the principles and values of Western liberal democracies, and their economic systems.

From "Aid or Development?"

By Willem Gustaaf Zeylstra.

The needs of the countries involved in the Marshall Plan did not differ fundamental in nature from those of countries later called developing countries.

From "International Aid"

By I.M.D. Little & J.M. Clifford, p. 23 (London 1965).

[...] once a donor has invested more than some crucial amount in a particular recipient country, its prestige (if not its financial interest) becomes so closely identified with that country's performance that the recipient acquires more influence over the donor than the donor over the recipient. Something of the kind has probably occurred in South Vietnam and Fomosa -- the fact that military strategy is involved does not alter the argument, since if USA prestige were not involved in these countries, their loss would not be of any great strategic importance [...]

From "Aid or Development?"

By Willem Gustaaf Zeylstra, p. 31.

In 1947, President Truman and his advisers feared that communism would gain ground and eventually win control in the countries of West and South Europe, unless the threatening collapse of these economies could be warded off. A third struggle for power in Europe could be lost in this way even before reaching a military confrontation. This danger could be averting only by means of American economic support. "Relief", the supplying of the immediate needs of these countries, was no longer sufficient. A new program of assistance on a much larger scale was needed, directed towards "economic reconstruction and recovery", that is towards removing the causes of the deficencies.

From "Aid or Development?"

By Willem Gustaaf Zeylstra, p. 26.

This idealism [expressed in Bretton Woods and San Francisco] was not a response to extraneous impulses but was a reaction to Western experience. In so far as it contained an element of altruism, the latter had not been an answer to supplications from the outside for assistance, but was inspired by a growing awareness of responsibility for the state of the world at large. The immense suffering the war had caused and the sacrifices that were the price of victory simply had to have a meaning. Moreover, this time the end of the war should bring lasting peace, to be secured by eliminating all possible causes of future international friction. As early as 1944, the Allied Powers, wishing to demonstrate their cenfidence that complete victory would soon be theirs and would be won for a worthy cause, prompted them to meet in Bretton Woods to agree on the preparations necessary to produce a better world at the war's end.

From "The Economic Factor in International Relations"

By Economides & Wilson, p. 133.

The argument that aid is intrinsically politicised as it is a government-to-government exchange, and implicitly an act involving potential mutual benefits, has contributed to the rejection, by extreme neo-liberals, of aid as an effective means of eradicating poverty and promoting economic growth.

From "The Economic Factor in International Relations"

By Wilson & Economides, p. 132.

In the late 1980s, Japan surpassed the US as the world's largest provider of foreign economic aid, and its share of the funds of the Development Assistance Council of the OECD jumped to 18 per cent. The stated objectives of Japan's aid programmes are primarily to assist in the economic development of less developed countries, while over 75 per cent of its aid packages are extended to countries in the Asian-Pacific region. Within this region, one of the recipients of Japanese economic assistance is the People's Republic of China. While the development of the Chinese economy is in the interest of Japan because of its market potential, Japanese leaders have a secondary objective in mind. China could be termed a developing economy, although it cannot be categorised alongside the African and poorer Pacific recipients of Japanese aid. China, nonetheless, is a potential military threat with its vast military and nuclear capability. In this sense Japanese aid serves the dual purpose of facilitating the creation of a lucrative Chinese market from which it can reap benefits, but also ensuring that China will not find any value in physically threatening Japan or its broader interests in the Asian-Pacific area.

From "The Economic Factor in International Relations"

By Spyros Economides & Peter Wilson, p. 131.

[...] a form of bribery in which the donor state offers resources and demands something morally shady in return. this could take the form of rights to military base facilities, or the promise of a supporting vote in the UN Security Council [...]

From "The Economic Factor in International Relations"

By Spyros Economides & Peter Wilson, p. 130.

[...] the cynic would argue that the Nordic states, and primarily Sweden, who place a great emphasis on the moral and humanitarian goals of their distinctive and extensive aid policies, expect to reap benefits from these policies. They extol the virtues of the unilateral nature of the policies, and couch them in terms of altruism from which they expect no benefit at all. In fact, they are unconscious reflections of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particluar time.